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Abstract
In the last two years, the Eleventh Circuit decided several cases
which have raised controversial questions about the treatment of liens’
or secured claims2 in consumer bankruptcy.
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I. SECURED CLAIMS IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
In the last two years, the Eleventh Circuit decided several cases
which have raised controversial questions about the treatment of liens'
or secured claims2 in consumer bankruptcy. In In re Folendore,3 the
court accepted an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code unsupported
in either pre-Code or legislative history: that a debtor in chapter 74
may avoid wholly undersecured claims under section 506(d).6 Secured
claims have received a chilly reception in bankruptcy throughout the
years, and Folendore is frostier than most.
Related to Folendore is the development of home mortgage lien-
stripping6 in chapter 13": that a chapter 13 debtor may limit the mort-
gage lien during and after the chapter 13 case to the value of the
home.8 Although the Eleventh Circuit has yet to rule on the controver-
* Professor of Law, Nova University, Shepard Broad Law Center. LL.M., New
York University; J.D., St. Louis University. This author thanks Andrew Kessler for
assisting with this article.
1. The Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the U.S.C. [hereinafter Code], states that a
"'lien' means charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988).
2. The Code defines a secured claim broadly in section 506(a): "An allowed
claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest
. . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the
estate's interest in such property . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
3. In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537 (1lth Cir. 1989).
4. Chapter 7 of the Code provides for the liquidation of the debtor's nonexempt
assets from which creditors will receive payment. The remaining chapters of the Code
deal with reorganization of debtors.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
6. Lien-stripping is the invalidation of a lien on property to the extent that the
property has a value less than the debt secured by the lien.
7. Chapter 13 of the Code is a reorganization chapter. Debtor commits to a three
(sometimes five) year payment plan. When, or if, the plan is completed, the debtor is
discharged from any remaining debt other than domestic obligations and long-term
debt. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988).
8. Although this issue has not appeared in a reported Eleventh Circuit opinion, a
discussion of the Third Circuit opinion in Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg. Co., 895
F.2d 123 (3rd Cir. 1990), is included because Folendore may foreordain that result.
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sial question of home mortgage lien-stripping in chapter 13, the
Folendore decision and the recent validation of serial bankruptcy filings
in Saylors9 suggest that a "chapter 20"10 may permit a debtor to lien-
strip a home mortgage." In general under chapter 7, lien..stripping is
controversial as is lien-stripping a home mortgage under chapter 13.
Bankruptcy is complex because the interpretation of the 1978
Code breeds three recurrent controversies. First, the functions of the
several different chapters of the Code, as well as the different avenues
of relief, are both alike, yet different. Second, a large number of key
provisions of the Code, especially Chapter 5, apply to all chapters
under which a debtor, and sometimes a creditor, may file for relief.
Unless the Code drafters strove for controversy, it is a grave error to
assume the usefulness, or appropriateness, of such a significanit number
of provisions for different forms of debtor relief. Surely, the drafters'
expectation of how all the provisions would fit together exceeded their
draftsmanship. Core conceptions in bankruptcy often fit a paradigm of
liquidation and discharge; others fit a paradigm of reorganization,
Rarely do the core conceptions fill the same function in both liquidation
and reorganization. Because a number of core matters receive prescrip-
tion in Chapter 5, the courts have had some difficulty finding how these
fit both liquidation cases under Chapter 7 and reorganization cases
under Chapters 11 and 13. The third essential creating more than tech-
nical controversy under the Code is public policy. Lien.stripping in
bankruptcy generates controversy not only for its novelty, but because
it significantly differs from lien avoidance under the classical,' 2 strong-
arm,'" preference' 4 and fraudulent transfer1 5 ideas. The classical theo-
ries of lien avoidance rest on a perceived inter-creditor unfairness. The
strong-arm power invalidates pre-bankruptcy liens because failure to
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
9. In re Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1989).
10. See infra note 92.
11. The use of a chapter 20 to lien-strip a home mortgage should be impermissi-
ble, and Folendore itself does not permit such a strategy. See infra notes 75-99.
12. The classical lien avoidance provisions of bankruptcy law antedate the Bank-
ruptcy Code of 1978 and were firm fixtures of bankruptcy jurisprudence at that time.
See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by the Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, ch.
575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1979). These classical lien avoidance provisions continue in
present law. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (a) (1988).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 548.
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notice the lien presumably misleads other creditors. Preferences upset
traditional bankruptcy norms concerning what creditors should receive.
Similarly, fraudulent transfers to creditors and donees, prior to bank-
ruptcy, affect bankruptcy's distributional norms. For the most part,
creditors and other third parties can engage in transactions with proper
planning and immunize their interests from classical lien avoidance.
That is, what one might regard as legitimate secured transactions en-
tered into with a debtor prior to bankruptcy, properly executed and
perfected, rarely result in avoidable liens under the classical lien avoid-
ance powers.
However, the new phenomena of lien-stripping arises from either
market value fluctuation or mistaken collateral valuation. Planning can
generally control only the latter. Even if planning could control market
value fluctuation, lien-stripping under the Code would remain contro-
versial to the extent it exceeds the proper balance of debtor and credi-
tor benefits. The ideal balance, if any, is controversial. Thus, lien-strip-
ping as a debtor's tool will remain controversial.
A. In re Folendore
In Folendore, the Eleventh Circuit permitted the use of a contro-
versial lien-stripping 16 power by a chapter 7 debtor. Prior to Folendore,
courts outside of this circuit disagreed about whether section 506(d)
not only determines valid secured claims against the bankruptcy estate,
but also invalidates liens outside of the bankruptcy case. 17 The question
16. See supra note 6 (defining lien-stripping). Folendore approves a controversial
interpretation of section 506(d) permitting the foregoing form of lien-stripping in a
chapter 7 case, discussed infra notes 29-41. Other forms of lien-stripping are less con-
troversial. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
17. Compare In re Gaglia, 889 F.2d 1304 (3rd Cir. 1989); In re Lindsey, 823
F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Moses, 110 Bankr, 962 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990); In
re Brouse, 110 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Zlogar, 101 Bankr. 1 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Garnett, 99 Bankr. 757 (D.W.D. Ky. 1989); In re Hougland, 83
Bankr. 648 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988); In re O'Leary, 75 Bankr. 881 (Bankr. D. Or.
1987); In re Worrell, 67 Bankr. 16 (C.D. II1. 1986); In re Cleveringa, 52 Bankr. 56
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); In re Lyons, 46 Bankr. 604 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1985); In re
Gibbs, 44 Bankr. 475 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); Brace v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 33 Bankr. 91 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Tanner, 14 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1981); In re Walker, 11 Bankr. 43 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1981); with In re Dewsnup,
908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990) cert. granted, 111 S.Ct. 949 (1991); In re Israel, 112
Bankr. 481 (D. Conn. 1990); In re D'Angona, 107 Bankr. 448 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989);
In re Shrum, 98 Bankr. 995 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989); In re McLaughlin, 92 Bankr.
1991]
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of extra-bankruptcy lien enforcement would not generally arise, but for
a longstanding principle in bankruptcy: that discharge of debt does not
per se invalidate a lien securing debt after bankruptcy.18 Congress un-
doubtedly reaffirmed the latter principle, 19 and further provided debtors
express provisions for avoiding certain liens in bankruptcy, so that after
bankruptcy, debtors' fresh starts are unimpaired by lien survival.20
Lien-stripping was part of the package of new rights individual
debtors received under the 1978 Code. In chapter 7, individual2 debt-
ors may strip particular liens which impair their enjoyment of exempt
property.2 2 In chapter 13, individuals 23 may confirm a plan which limits
payments on the secured claim to the value of the collateral. 24 Yet, the
use of section 506(d) to strip-down a lien received no mention in the
legislative history.2 5 Other sections provide classical avoidance of what
913 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988); In re Verma, 91 Bankr. 17 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); In re
Maitland, 61 Bankr. 130 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); In re Wolf, 58 Bankr. 354 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Cordes, 37 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984); In re
Mahaner, 34 Bankr. 308 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1983); In re Nefferdorf, 26 Bankr. 962
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); see also In re Simmons, 765 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1985); In re
Schneider, 37 Bankr. 115 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1984); In re Spadel, 28 Bankr. 537
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Harvey, 3 Bankr. 608 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980).
A decision in Dewsnup, now before the Supreme Court, should resolve this
conflict.
18. Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620 (1886); In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464, 465
(7th Cir. 1984).
19. Section 524 (a)(2) as originally enacted included the phrase, "or property of
the debtor," which some courts understandably assumed overruled Long, 117 U.S. at
617; e.g., In re Willie Williams, 9 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). Congress subse-
quently deleted the phrase.
20. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f), 722 (1988).
21. "Person" is defined in the Code as an "individual, partnership, and corpora-
tion .... " 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1988). Only individuals receive exemptions under
the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
22. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f). Courts have disagreed about whether section 522(f)
applies in Chapter 13 cases. Compare In re Hall, 752 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that it does apply) with In re Berry, 30 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
23. Only individuals may file under chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)(ii).
25. The House concluded that:
Subsection [506](d) permits liens to pass through the bankruptcy case
unaffected. However, if a party in interest requests the court to determine
and allow or disallow the claim secured by the lien under section 502 and
the claim is not allowed, then the lien is void to the extent that the claim is
not allowed.
H.R. REP. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 357 (1977), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CONG. &
[Vol. 15
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section 506(d) recognizes as secured claims in appropriate cases. 26
What is striking about the balance Congress apparently made in
the Code for chapter 7 cases is the specific limitation of the debtor's
lien-stripping power to certain kinds of liens27 on certain exempt or ex-
emptible property under section 522.28 In contrast, section 506 applies
to all claims of liens, whether they are statutory, consensual, judicial or
common law liens. Additionally, section 506 speaks about secured
claims on any kind of property, real or personal, exempt, exemptible or
non-exempt. In Folendore, a chapter 7 debtor sought to avoid a third
mortgage 29 held by the Small Business Administration (SBA) on real
ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6313.
It also noted that:
Subsection [506](d) provides that to the extent a secured claim is not
allowed, its lien is void unless the holder had neither actual notice nor
knowledge of the case, the lien was not listed by the debtor in a chapter 9
or 11 case or such claim was disallowed only under section 502(e).
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5854.
Each of these reports on the Bankruptcy Code limits the voidability of a secured
claim under section 506(d) to claims which are not allowable claims in bankruptcy.
These reports show that section 506(a) determines whether an allowed claim is a se-
cured claim. Further, they show that section 506(d) defines what is an allowed claim
for purposes of section 506(a). With exceptions stated in section 506(d), claims which
are not allowed under section 502(b), the general allowance of claims provision of the
Code, cannot become secured claims in a bankruptcy proceeding. Liens secure claims;
if a claim is invalid, the lien is also invalid in a bankruptcy proceeding. The legislative
history thus shows that section 506(d) deals with the problem of liens securing claims
which are not allowable in the bankruptcy. However, the recent cases such as
Folendore have construed the function of section 506(d) as also regarding the problem
of the undersecured lien.
26. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. These other sections operate
when section 506 recognizes a secured claim. For example, one, who prior to bank-
ruptcy, had obtained a first mortgage on land owned by the debtor will have a secured
claim in the debtor's bankruptcy. If the creditor obtained that mortgage as a gift from
the debtor, the mortgage will first be identified by section 506 as a secured claim and in
all likelihood, the secured claim will be avoided as a fraudulent transfer under section
548.
27. Debtor's lien-stripping power is limited to judicial liens on exempt property
and nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests in particular personal prop-
erty subject to exemption. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f)(1)(2).
28. See § 522(0(2).
29. The opinions in the case do not mention whether the realty in issue was ex-
empt property. Even if it were, the lien-stripping rules for exempt property were inap-
plicable since only judicial liens may be stripped from exempt realty. § 522(f)(1). That
the realty was not exemptible is implicit in the trustee's decision to abandon the prop-
1991)
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property abandoned by the trustee.30 The combined liens of these first
two mortgages exceeded the value of the collateral."1 Section 506(d)3 2
provides: "(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the
debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void .... .,3
The issue in Folendore is whether a lien securing an allowable
claim is voidable under section 506(d) in a chapter 7 case. The court
stated the issue as the following: "[W]hether an unsecured lien sup-
ported by an allowable claim is voidable under 11 U.S.C.A. §
506(d)." 4 The court held that such a lien was voidable and reversed.
erty for lack of equity in the estate's interest. Abandonment under section 554 of prop-
erty in which the estate's interest is merely nominal is routine and enables the trustee
to avoid fruitless estate expenses, such as participating in a motion by secured claim-
ants for relief from stay.
30. 862 F.2d at 1538.
31. The parties had stipulated in the bankruptcy court that the senior liens ex-
ceeded the value of the property subject to the mortgages. Both courts below denied the
avoidance the debtors sought under section 506(d) because the debtors had not previ-
ously requested disallowance of the claim under section 502. In re Folendore, 85 Bankr.
180 (M.D. Ga. 1988).
However, it should be noted that the district court clearly stated that it did not
consider the lack of a request for disallowance to have been a formal or procedural
defect. The district court ruled on the basis of "cases holding that a debtor in a chapter
7 case may not use § 506(d) to void the consensual lien of a creditor because the lien is
undersecured." Id. at 182.
32. Section 506(d) was amended in 1984 to eliminate the exception to its avoid-
ance rule that stated, "unless a party in interest has not requested that the court deter-
mine and allow or disallow such claim under section 502 of this title." 11 U.S.C. §
506(d) (1978)(amended 1984). However, the revised exceptions to the avoidance rule
expressly exempt certain disallowed claims from the operation of the rule: "(1) such
claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or (2) such
claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a
proof of such claim under section 501 of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
Thus, one may well find unpersuasive the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the
avoidance rule does not presume a disallowed claim. See Folendore, 862 F.2d at 1539.
If the exceptions contemplate particularly grounded disallowances, the rule must con-
template disallowable claims. Otherwise, the rule would not need the exceptions origi-
nally or presently stated. The Folendore court describes the now repealed request ex-
ception, the 1979 version of section 506(d)(1), as serving a vital function. 862 F.2d at
1539 n.3.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). The exceptions which followed the quoted body of sec-
tion 506(d) when the case arose stated: "(1) a party in interest has not requested that
the court determine and allow or disallow such claim under section 502 of this title; or
(2) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(e) of this title." 11 U.S.C. §
506(d) (1978)(amended 1984).
34. 862 F.2d at 1538.
[Vol. 15
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"The plain language of the statute, supported by a majority of the
bankruptcy courts, inferences drawn from the 1984 amendments, and
common sense, [sic] requires the SBA's lien be voidable whether or not
its claim has been disallowed under section 502."1
Is the statute plain? The statute states that a lien is void to the
extent it secures a claim against the debtor that is "not an allowed
secured claim."3 In Folendore the parties agreed that the SBA did not
have an "allowed secured claim."' 37 The SBA unsuccessfully pointed
out that it held an allowed claim. Its position was that section 506(d)
only voids liens securing disallowed claims. Since its claim was allowa-
ble, the lower courts properly rejected the debtors' attempted
avoidance.
Undoubtedly, the expression "not an allowed secured claim" is
ambiguous. There are two reasons why a claim may not be allowed and
secured. First, the claim may be wholly invalid and thus not allowed in
bankruptcy. Second, though a claim may be valid and allowed, it may
have nothing securing it, and thus not be a secured claim under section
506(a). The issue is whether the expression "not an allowed secured
claim" in section 506(d) refers only to situations in which a secured
claim (determined by section 506(a)) is not allowed under section 502.
The legislative history speaks only to this function of section 506(d).8
Or does the expression also embrace allowable claims which are not
secured claims under section 506(a). The language is not plain.
The exceptions presume the text speaks to claims that are not al-
lowable under other sections of the Code.39 The inferences the court
drew from the 1984 amendments may be countered by equally plausi-
ble inferences.4 °
The court erred in relying on common sense in justification of its
conclusion.
35. Id. at 1539.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
37. What is an "allowed secured claim" is nowhere defined in the code. The
court and the parties appear to have presumed that section 506(a) defines what is an
allowed secured claim. But, section 506(a) only says that an allowed claim, in reference
to section 502, secured by a lien on property is a "secured claim." I 1 U.S.C. § 506(a).
The phrase "allowed secured claim" does not appear in section 506(a) at all but ap-
pears in sections 506(b)-(d).
38. See supra notes 25 & 32.
39. See supra note 32.
40. See supra note 32.
1991]
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The whole point of bankruptcy is to provide a debtor with a
fresh start. Section 506 allows the debtor the option to begin anew
on its former property, Section 506 does not give a debtor it prop-
erty back as some sort of windfall. It simply permits a debtor to
eventually repurchase an equity interest in it, something the SBA
admits it [the debtor] has the right to do on any other piece of
land.4 1
Bankruptcy is intended to provide relief to both debtors and credi-
tors. The court's function is to determine the meaning of an often diffi-
cult bankruptcy text. Reliance on plain meaning characterizations of
undefined, ambiguous statutory language is unfair to both debtors and
creditors.12
The potential impact of Folendore may be addressed by consider-
ing why a debtor like Folendore would want to avoid a lien when prop-
erty is worth no more than the debts secured by senior liens. Valuation
of estate property is speculative. A debtor may think the collateral is
worth more than the amount determined by the bankruptcy court. As
well, property values may be temporarily distressed. At some future
time, a debtor might be able to make a deal with senior lienors or bor-
row the money to buy them out. However, a trustee in a chapter 7 case
is unlikely to await for these developments. Once the property is aban-
41. Folendore, 862 F.2d at 1540.
42. A further point against Folendore is that pre-Code law stated none of this.
The Supreme Court has found pre-Code treatment of liens in bankruptcy critical when
the Code is unclear. See United Savings Assoc. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1989). Pre- and post-Code case law clearly state that such a lien,
along with the senior liens, survive bankruptcy whether or not the debtor gets a dis-
charge of the underlying debt. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Perhaps the majority of courts have confused the invalidation of a secured claim,
per section 506(d) as a claim against property of the estate, with invalidity in general.
The function of section 506 is merely administrative: to define what and who has a
secured claim in bankruptcy for a ban kruptcy case administration. One who has a fully
secured claim could not participate, for example, in distribution from the unencum-
bered assets' liquidation. Nevertheless, one can appreciate the ease with which invalid-
ity of a secured claim in a bankruptcy proceeding may be broadened to invalidity for
all purposes - when a junior lien is not a secured claim in bankruptcy because the
senior liens secure debt greater than the value of collateral. The Code seems to say this
since by the term "void," one might understand the paramount federal law of the Code
as superseding contrary state law. Unless one understands the characterization of an
invalid secured claim under section 506(d) as implicitly limited to questions arising in
the bankruptcy case, one may read the subsection universally.
[Vol. 15
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doned by the trustee,43 the debtor's relatively inexpensive request 44 for
avoidance under section 506(d) might encourage optimism on the
debtor's part of eventually finding equity in the property.
In substance, lien cramdown 45 in reorganization cases proceeds
under section 506 in the same initial manner as Folendore. The amount
of a secured claim is obtained by determining the value of the collat-
eral. When the collateral is worth less than the debt it secures, the
amount of the secured claim is the value of the collateral. A debtor in
reorganization must pay a secured claim at least the value of collateral
under the plan, unless the claimant agrees to a lesser payment. This
general structure of lien cramdown permeates the Code. Chapter 13
clearly limits all secured claims except for home mortgages to the value
of the collateral.46 Likewise, Chapter 12 states the same secured claim
cramdown rule,47 and chapter 11 differs only in the right of an under-
secured creditor's opportunity to elect treatment of the claim as fully
secured. 48 So, under the Code, the effect of lien-stripping as per section
506 will occur routinely in rehabilitation cases under the Code. Lien-
stripping is a reorganization concept because it has traditionally been
provided as a reorganization cramdown device.
What is strange about Folendore is not the substance but the locus
of the lien-stripping in a chapter 7 liquidation case. An argument for
lien-stripping under section 506(d) may point to other Code sections
providing for lien-stripping within Chapter 7, such as sections 72241
and 522(f). 50 However, the redemption opportunity of section 722 is
narrow. This right of redemption applies only to exempt personal prop-
erty intended for personal, family or household use, and only if such
property secures a dischargeable consumer debt.51 Likewise, lien-strip-
ping under section 522 extends only to exempt property.
43. The trustee may abandon property of the estate when the property has "in-
consequential value or benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
44. Or, is the request seemingly inexpensive? Potential appeals to the district or
circuit courts of appeal surely bear on the utility of requesting and opposing avoidance
under section 506(d).
45. The term cramdown describes the process in which a secured claim is re-
duced to the value of the collateral.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)(ii).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B) (1988).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (1988).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0.
51. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
1991]
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The implications of the Folendore treatment of section 506(d) in a
distressed market are serious. Whether Folendore will lead to the re-
sults suggested in the following hypotheticals is speculative, since the
courts may confine their analyses to only the most junior liens. For
example, suppose I borrow money to add a pool or some other improve-
ment to my house. Subsequently, I incur financial difficulty and file
chapter 7 or 13 .52 The current market value of my house is 50 % below
$200,000, the amount I paid. I financed at 90% on my first mortgage
and another 10% on a second mortgage for the pool. The house today
at filing is worth $100,000.
Having filed chapter 7, I use section 506(d) to avoid the junior lien
per Folendore, because the junior lien is worthless: the senior mortgage
exceeds the value of the collateral. Next, I also avoid so much of the
first lien that exceeds $100,000, the present value of the collateral, and
I discharge both debts. Because I have kept the first mortgage debt
current and continue to keep it current through bankruptcy, the first
mortgagee cannot get relief from stay during the bankruptcy nor may
it foreclose thereafter. Sometime after bankruptcy when the market
rises, I refinance or sell the property. The payoff to the first mortgagee
is $100,000, the amount of its lien, less any principal paydowns made
since its lien was reduced to that amount pursuant to the section
506(d) determination. Any contractual attempt to stop me from so do-
ing falls under the supremacy clause. Any attempt to collect the debt
on that mortgage is stayed. 53
52. Section 1111 (b) of chapter 11 inhibits this form of lien-stripptng. Under sec-
tion 111 (b), an undersecured creditor may elect to have its secured claim allowed in
the amount of the debt secured. That is, section 506 is displaced by section 1111 (b). As
a result of the election, a secured creditor must receive payments under the plan
amounting to the debt. However, the secured claim may be paid over time and the time
value of the payments must amount to no less than the value of the collateral. In terms
of the present value of future payments, even an electing undersecured creditor receives
in a chapter 11 plan only the value of its collateral. However, an electing undersecured
creditor retains its lien on its collateral during the performance of a plan in the full
amount of the debt. As a result, such a creditor may enforce that lien pcst-confirmation
should the debtor default under the plan. The post-bankruptcy effectiveness of its lien
differentiates chapter 11 lien-stripping from the chapter 7 lien-stripping accepted by
Folendore. Should the collateral later appreciate in value due only to market forces,
the electing undersecured creditor, who elected to have the entire claim treated as se-
cured, may reap the appreciation if the debtor defaults. Under Folendore, the lien-
stripped creditor in chapter 7 presumably cannot reinvigorate its lien after bankruptcy.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2).
[Vol. 15
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B. Chapter 13 Home Mortgage Strip-down
In the same scenario, I may file chapter 13 rather than chapter 7,
so long as I meet the jurisdictional limitations of chapter 13. 5 Whether
I may use the section 506(d) strip-down in my scenario depends not
only on the controversy about section 506(d), but also on a controver-
sial passage which appears only in chapter 13. Under section
1322(b)(2), a chapter 13 plan may "modify the rights of holders of
secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor's principal residence . . . ."5 Recently,
the third86 and the ninth57 circuits have created a controversy by
broadly interpreting a chapter 13 debtor's right to modify a secured
claim against the debtor's principal residence. 58 These cases depend on
section 506 and especially the Folendore interpretation. Cramdown in
chapter 13 is precisely what section 506(d) accomplished in my previ-
ous example: all a chapter 13 debtor need pay a secured claim is the
value of the collateral (any deficiency participates as an unsecured
claim). Chapter 13 debtors have been cramming down secured claims
on cars and nonresidential property for 12 years.5 But, such debtors
were thought unable to affect their home mortgage because of section
1322(b), which states a chapter 13 plan "may modify the rights of
holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence
54. Code section 109(e) permits only individuals to use chapter 13. Individuals
may have aggregate secured debts no greater than $350,000 and aggregate unsecured
debts no greater than $100,000. Additionally, to file under chapter 13 one must have a
regular source of income. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
56. Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
57. In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
59. Indeed, the courts have also permitted cramdown on the principal residence
of a debtor when the debt is secured by more than only the principal residence of the
debtor. This occurs because section 1322(b)(2) limits the chapter 13 debtor's general
right to modify secured claims to claims secured "only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence." § 1322(b)(2); see Wilson v. Com-
monwealth Mortg. Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990) (alternate holding); In re
Selman, 120 Bankr. 576 (Bankr. D. N.M. (1990); In re Stiles, 74 Bankr. 708 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1987); In re Lapp, 66 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); In re Ramirez, 62
Bankr. 668 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986); In re Baksa, 5 Bankr. 184 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1980).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b).
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The third and ninth circuits held that the "rights o1' holders of
secured claims" means only their rights as a secured claimant deter-
mined by section 506(a).6 ' Because section 506(a) includes as a se-
cured claim only that portion of a claim for which the value of the
collateral provides security, an undersecured claim gives rise to a se-
cured claim only in the amount of the value of the security or collat--
eral. As to the excess of the debt above the value of the collateral, an
unsecured claim is created. Wilson and Hougland interpret the non-
modification rule of section 1322(b)(2) for principal residence mort-
gages to refer only to the secured claim as determined by section
506(a). However, the unsecured claim is modifiable. In effect, this ap-
pears to mean that the amount of the promised monthly mortgage in-
stallment cannot be modified, but the amount of the outstanding mort-
gage balance can be modified and stripped-down to the value of the
collateral as determined under section 506(a). Thus, a debtor's monthly
payment on the home mortgage, cannot be reduced, but a debtor may
have the court adjudicate the outstanding balance of the mortgage lien
as invalid to the extent the debt exceeds the property value.
Under this approach, the same result may be reached in my hypo-
thetical through a chapter 13 case as well as in a chapter 7. As noted
earlier, the ordinary cramdown of secured. claims to the value of the
collateral holds in chapter 13, but the specific limitation of section
1322(b)(2) bars home mortgage strip-down.62 Whether the decisions in
Wilson and Hougland will prevail in the Eleventh Circuit remains to
be seen. Much may be said against the cited rulings, however, I shall
discuss only two points.
A secured claim in a chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding cannot
have a value larger than that of the collateral. Section 1322(b)(2) per-
61. Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128; Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1183.
62. Compare In re Woodall, 123 Bankr. 95 (W.D. Okla. 1990). In re Moran,
121 Bankr. 879 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990); In re Chavez, 117 Bankr. 733 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1990); In re Sauber, 115 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Schum, 112
Bankr. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Diquinzio, 110 Bankr. 628 (Bankr. D. R.I.
1990); In re Russell, 93 Bankr. 703 (D.N.D. 1988); In re Brown, 91 Bankr. 19 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1988) with In re Bellamy, 122 Bankr. 856 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991); Goins v.
Diamond Mortg. Corp., 119 Bankr. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re McNair, 115
Bankr. 520 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re Gadson, 114 Bankr. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1990); In re Brouse, 110 Bankr. 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Demoff, 109 Bankr.
902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Ross,, 107 Bankr. 759 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989);
In re Kessler, 99 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Hill, 96 Banlcr. 809 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Harris, 94 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1989).
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mits modification of the rights of any claimant, secured or unsecured.63
Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) entitles any secured claimant to payments
under the plan amounting to no less than its "allowed secured claim." 4
That amount is the value of the collateral determined by either section
506 or by stipulation. When section 1322(b)(2) permits modification of
secured claims, it cannot be addressing the issue of what the secured
claimant's entitlement under the plan is, since section 1325(a)(5) di-
rectly provides for entitlement once the section 506 determination of
the amount of the secured claim is made. Thus, the function of section
1322(b)(2) regarding strip-down is mere reiteration of the lien strip-
down that the other cited sections accomplish.
The exception of the home mortgage from this strip-down reitera-
tion can have only one meaning: that a chapter 13 debtor has all the
modification rights, including strip-down per section 506, that debtors
in other chapters have, 65 except when the home mortgage is used as the
sole security for a debt. There are no other substantial modification
rights which would not otherwise be available to the chapter 13
debtor. 66 However, Hougland and Wilson suggest that substantial
meaning remains in section 1322(b)(2) because these decisions bar the
debtor from payment under the plan of less than the contractually
agreed-upon monthly installment.
Thus, under this view the non-modifiability of the monthly pay-
ment is what section 1322(b)(2) accomplishes. The courts could have
understood section 1322(b)(5) to provide as much.6 7 However, the
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
65. Section 506 applies in all chapters of the Code unless displaced by a particu-
lar provision in a chapter. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
66. For example, there is the right of cure of default which presumably includes
the right to decelerate, reverse a mortgagee's acceleration of the debt. 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(5).
67. Section 1322(b)(5) requires the "maintenance of payments while the case is
pending on any ... secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date on
which the final payment under the plan is due." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5). The "pay-
ments" to which this subsection refers must be the amounts promised prior to the
bankruptcy because the sentence begins with the idea of curing default, which is con-
nected to the quoted text with "and." Id. It is unimaginable that a debtor would have
been thought by Congress to have either desire or need to cure a pre-bankruptcy de-
fault and then maintain any payments other than those which would not create another
default. As well, this subsection applies while a case is pending, which typically refers
to both pre- and post-confirmation periods. Presumably, no modifications could precede
confirmation of the chapter 13 plan. So, what payment the debtor would maintain
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grammatical argument within section 1322(b)(2) accepted by the
Hougland and Wilson courts, is far less convincing once one recognizes
maintenance of monthly payments to fall under section 1:322(b)(5).
Secondly, these recent cases overlook the confirmation rule for an
"allowed secured claim" applicable when the secured claimant has
neither accepted the plan,6 8 nor has the debtor surrendered the collat-
eral to the creditor.6 9 The confirmation rule provides that the secured
creditor retain its lien 0 and mandates that "the value, as of the effec-
tive date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such
claim." 71 Modification of the home mortgage, through strip-down to
current value of the lien and payment merely of the monthly install-
ment, cannot satisfy this controlling confirmation rule, unless payments
under the plan will fully pay-off the newly determined mortgage bal-
ance.2 Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) requires payments not less than the
allowed amount of the secured claim.1 Few debtors in chapter 13 will
be able to satisfy the rule since even a bankruptcy-reduced outstanding
balance of the mortgage will far exceed the sum of 3 or 5 years of
regular payments. 7" Also, refinancing is not easily available to such
would have to be the contractual amount. Finally, this subsection applies "notwith-
standing [1322(b)(2)]." Id.
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A). "Acceptance" of a chapter 13 plan is not defined
in chapter 13. Traditionally, plan acceptance in reorganization means voting favorably
on the plan. See e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988). As well under chapter 11, an
unimpaired class as defined in section 1124(1) is deemed to have accepted a plan. See
§ 1126(0. A class of claims is unimpaired when the plan does not alter its pre-bank-
ruptcy rights. § 1124(1). The pro-modification cases seem to assume that a home mort-
gagee which will receive its regular installment payments under a plan has not been
impaired and is thus deemed to have accepted the plan. Not only ha; chapter 13 no
such impairment/non-impairment provision, it also lacks any rule presuming an
unimpaired creditor to have accepted a plan.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5(B)(i).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
72. In re Cobb, 122 Bankr. 22 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
74. A debtor may not confirm a chapter 13 plan which exceeds 3 years unless the
court, for cause, approves a longer period, not to exceed 5 years. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(c),
1329(c) (1988). Chapter 13 may not require that a debtor include a home mortgage
debt in the plan. Chapter 13 only governs the plan and the debt provided for in the
plan. However, in order to modify or cure a claim, under section 1322(b), the debtor
must do so in the plan. The right to cure arrearages on a mortgage, for example, under
section 1322(b)(5) is a right exercisable "under the plan." To cure arrearages, the
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debtors on normal credit considerations or on a refinancing agency's
discovery of the debtor's proposal.
C. Serial Bankruptcy Filings: Saylors75
If Folendore may truly be used in a chapter 7 to accomplish strip-
down of the home mortgage, debtors should continue to favor chapter 7
for the traditional reasons.76 Debtors for whom chapter 13 relief is im-
portant"7 and who also desire home mortgage strip-down, may be able
to pursue a serial bankruptcy strategy. Under this strategy, debtors
first file chapter 7 to obtain lien strip-down and later file, or convert, to
chapter 13. Although no less controversial than the other recent devel-
opments discussed in this article, serial bankruptcy filings were ap-
proved by the Eleventh Circuit recently in Saylors.7 8
Quite apart from lien-stripping, a debtor in a chapter 7 may incur
difficulty with the home mortgage or other property on which a creditor
holds a lien. Although a chapter 7 debtor has some protections against
an aggressive secured creditor in a chapter 7, including the automatic
stay of creditor action79 and personal property redemption under sec-
tion 722,80 the former may be lifted on behalf of a creditor who has
"cause for relief from stay." '
In Saylors, the mortgagee on the debtor's home obtained relief
from stay, in order to foreclose, shortly before the debtor's chapter 7
case was closed."2 The debtor filed chapter 13 the next day, even while
debtor must include payments on the arrearages during the 3-5 years of the plan. §
1322(b)(5).
75. In re Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 1989).
76. Chapter 7 does not require post-petition payment from post-petition income,
nor does it subject a debtor to continuing supervision for up to five years.
77. These debtors would generally include those who need to cure or modify
claims including secured claims. See § 1322(b)(2)(5). It also includes those who are
without an opportunity for discharge of debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988). Also
included are debtors who have nondischargeable chapter 7 debt dischargeable under
the broader chapter 13 discharge. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 1328(a) (1988). And,
debtors with substantial properties not exempt in a chapter 7.
78. 869 F.2d at 1437.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
80. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
82. Presumably, the debtor was in default on the debt which justified the relief
from stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
1991]
15
Kalevitch: Bankruptcy: Eleventh Circuit Review
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
the chapter 7 case remained open.83 The debtor filed8" chapter 13 for
two related reasons: first, to obtain another"9 automatic stay to pre-
clude the mortgagee from foreclosing, and secondly, to obtain confir-
mation of a chapter 13 plan which would permit cure of mortgage ar-
rearages and retention by debtor of his home.
Saylors' chapter 7 discharge eliminated his personal liability on
the note secured by his home mortgage. Nevertheless, the mortgage
lien remained on his home, and the mortgagee retained his rights
against the home without personal recourse against debtor, Saylors.
Nonrecourse claims86 do not expressly fall under the definition of
"claim" in section 101(4). Nor does chapter 13 further elaborate the
meaning of claim. But, the court ruled that Saylors could cure 7 this
nonrecourse claim because of the rule of construction provided by sec-
tion 102(2): "'[C]laim against the debtor' includes claim against the
property of the debtor." ' So long as a mortgagor, like Saylors, retains
a property interest in the land, such as provided by local law in this
case,' the court ruled that even a nonrecourse claim may be treated in
83. The court ruled that the previous filing under chapter 7 did not preclude a
second filing under chapter 13 during the period after the chapter 'I discharge and
before the chapter 7 case was closed. Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1437.
84. The debtor chose to file under chapter 13, rather than convert the case from
chapter 7 to chapter 13, because the debtor sought to stay the foreclosure. Conversion
may have produced merely the same stay of creditor action which the debtor had in his
chapter 7. If so, the relief from that stay which the creditor had obtained may have
been unaffected by the conversion. See In re States Airlines, Inc., 873 F.2d 264 (1 ith
Cir. 1989) (holding conversion from chapter 11 to chapter 7 does not reimpose stay
against parties previously granted relief from stay). "The filing of EL petition under
section 301, 302, or 303 operates as a stay under section 362. A conversion under
section 348 does not." Id. at 268.
If a conversion by Saylors would not have affected the automatic stay, then his
creditor who had previously received relief from stay, would not have its rights affected
by conversion. Thus, the need to file a new case under chapter 13 arose and carried the
cost of a new filing fee.
85. Whether a debtor with an open bankruptcy case can obtain another stay by
filing under another chapter, or by filing a new petition under the same chapter, is
unclear under the Code. Saylors rules on the former.
86. A nonrecourse claim in this context means a claim against particular prop-
erty of the debtor but without recourse against the debtor personally or his other assets
for any deficiency.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
88. Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1436.
89. Saylors had an equitable right of redemption under Alabama law.
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a chapter 13 plan.90 Further, Saylors' continuing property interest in
the home gave the chapter 13 bankruptcy court jurisdiction over this
property.91
Had Saylors simply filed chapter 13 to deal with a nonrecourse
claim against his home, the foregoing would hold some technical signif-
icance. The greater interest in Saylors is the serial bankruptcy or the
"chapter 20" 11 that the court approved. The court held the fact that
the chapter 13 was filed while the chapter 7 was still pending, did not
betray the debtor's necessary good faith. 3 "A per se rule . . . [would]
conflict with the purpose of Congress in adopting and designing chapter
13 plans."94 More broadly, the court held: "A bankruptcy court's de-
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. "Chapter 20" does not exist in the Code. But, a debtor who files chapter 7
and takes what relief that offers, and then files chapter 13, and takes the relief there
offered, has perhaps created a new Code chapter. Other numerical combinations have
appeared, such as a "chapter 26". E.g., In re Jones, 105 Bankr. 1007, 1011 (N.D. Ala.
W.D. 1989) (2 chapter 13 filings). The Code does not specifically impose any limita-
tions on the use of chapter 13 when a debtor has had previous bankruptcy relief. Under
chapter 7, however, the Code limits the availability of discharge where a debtor has
had previous bankruptcy relief. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(7)-(9). Courts have disagreed
about "chapter 20" and other serial filings. Compare In re Fulks, 93 Bankr. 274
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988) with In re Samarripas, 107 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1989) (Judge Baynes soundly concludes that a chapter 13 plan should not be confirmed
if the previous chapter 7 case should have been dismissed as a "substantial abuse"
under section 707(b)).
Prior to the Code, the Supreme Court in Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S.
392 (1966), permitted a debtor to file a chapter XIII extension plan, although within
the prior six years he had received a discharge in the predecessor to chapter 7. Saylors
relied on Perry. But, the latter uttered a clear dictum that the decision would not apply
to a chapter XIII composition (debt-reduction) plan. Perry, 383 U.S. at 397-98. As
chapter 13 does not permit composition of a secured claim such as Saylors' mortga-
gee's, unless the secured claimant assents, the Eleventh Circuit was perhaps correct in
Saylors in relying on the Perry precedent. However, where the creditor holds an under-
secured claim, the unsecured portion is subject to composition in chapter 13. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1325(a)(4), 1325(b). To that extent Perry would disapprove a chapter 20. As well,
a serial chapter 13 may not be effective under Perry in another foreseeable context:
where a debtor does not discharge an unsecured debt in chapter 7 because the debt is
nondischargeable under section 523(a), the debtor may wish to file chapter 13 and pay
the appropriate percentage of the debt under the plan. Perry would find this composi-
tion impermissible.
93. 869 F.2d at 1437. A chapter 13 plan must be "proposed in good faith." I1
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
94. Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1437.
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termination whether a chapter 13 plan has been proposed in good faith
is a finding of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. 95
Since the bankruptcy court was in the best position to judge the credi-
bility of the debtor, and it found one of the factors suggesting good
faith under controlling case law,96 the finding of good faith was not
clearly erroneous. Clearly then, chapter 13 filings following chapter 7
cases will receive serious scrutiny in the bankruptcy court. That deter-
mination will almost certainly stand on appeal, given the high standard
of clearly erroneous. As a device to accomplish lien-stripping of a home
mortgage, 97 a "chapter 20" will have formidable hurdles. :First, a court
may as a matter of law deny the combined effect of the two chapters as
doing indirectly what cannot be done directly under chapter 13 because
of section 1322(b)(2). Second, a court should factually find that a
chapter 13 plan has not been proposed in good faith if the prior or
pending chapter 7 case might have been dismissed as a substantial
abuse under section 707(b).98 Third, debtors will usually pay more
under the chapter 13 plan on the stripped-down mortgage than their
regular monthly payments to meet the secured claim cramdown
standard.9
II. CONCLUSION
All the implications of Folendore and the other recent cases need
not come to pass. The courts can, and should, limit Folendore and the
others so far as possible. Congress did not intend to imperil under-
secured claims for the benefit of an individual chapter 7 debtor. Nor
did Congress intend to jeopardize the home mortgage as have Wilson
95. Id. at 1438.
96. See In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885, 888-89 (11th Cir. 1983). The bankruptcy
court had found good faith in that Saylors income had increased by $283 between the
time of his two filings. Saylors, 869 F.2d at 1438.
97. This assumes the local courts will not follow Wilson and Hougland. See
supra notes 54-74 and accompanying text.
98. See Samarripas, 107 Bankr. at 366. A substantial abuse under section
707(b) consists of a debtor's filing chapter 7 when the debtor has the ability to pay
creditors. See, e.g., In re Rushing, 93 Bankr. 750 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988) (chapter 7
dismissed where debtors could have paid all unsecured claims within three years but
debtors sought to retain ski boat by reaffirmation).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii); see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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and Hougland. Finally, the courts should follow Saylors and permit
serial bankruptcy filings, but only upon a careful scrutiny of a debtor's
good faith.
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